Russia's annexation of Crimea by leader Vladimir Putin draws many historical comparisons to Adolf Hitler's annexation of the Sudetenland nearly 76 years ago. Vladimir Putin, Russia's three-term president, has signed a document officially recognizing the "reunification" of Ukraine's Crimea region with Russia, after recently invading the region. He claims not only that he invaded the area for the sake of the ethnic minority, but also that he corrected the historical mistake that gave Crimea to Ukraine in the first place. While his intentions were pure, they were weakened by the fact that they resembled Hitler's tactic of entering neighboring countries under the pretext of protecting his citizens. While there is no evidence that Putin wants to mirror Hitler's exact actions; his desire for dictatorship and his means of governing paralleled Hitler's as he imitated his invasion tactics. However, clear lessons should have been learned from Hitler's occupation that could be applied to the current situation with Crimea, which could help prevent another disaster and another fascist regime. After Germany's conquest of Austria, Hitler focused on the Germans living in the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia. First, he ordered the surrender of the Sudetenland to Germany, with full compliance by the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain. Hitler, therefore, promptly changed his orders so that the German army could seize the area. Seeing the matter as “a quarrel in a distant country between people we know nothing about” (Crimea), he put an end to it with the signing of the Munich Agreement. By signing this agreement, Chamberlain not only strengthened Germany, but also fueled Hitler's desire to have more power and to be surrounded by concrete goals, not just threats or unsupported accusations. Furthermore, the West should stop responding to Putin with “shock and amazement,” shocking that he can act with complete freedom and admiring his diplomatic genius. Both Europe and the United States have greater influence and resources than Russia, with its emaciated political system and tired economic model. They appear not to understand the economic and political costs of the moral protection they claim to bear. Finally, Western leaders must recognize that the policy of appeasement does not necessarily guarantee peace and stability in Europe. When they encounter a leader whose ideology is that the weak can be defeated, Western governments must show their determination, without giving up their resilience. Only then can the Ukrainian issue be addressed without substantially endangering transatlantic security.