This essay will address the question of whether computers can think, possess intelligence, or have mental states. We will proceed from two angles. First of all, it is necessary to define what constitutes “thought”. An investigation into this debate demonstrates, however, that the very definition of thought is a contested terrain. Secondly, reflection is needed on what form artificial intelligence should take, be it a notion of “simulated intelligence”, the weak AI hypothesis, or of “real thinking”, the strong AI hypothesis . (Russell, Norvig p 1020) The first angle informs us of the theoretical investigation of what it means to think about something, while the second seeks to probe how thinking might be shown to be occurring. As a result we have two splits: on the one hand, a disagreement about what constitutes thinking and on the other a question about methodological approaches to AI. However, this essay will argue that both supporters of the possibility of AI and its detractors are guilty of an anthropomorphic conception of thought. This is the idea implicit in the question of whether computers can think, we are actually asking whether they can think like us. Consequently, this debate can be characterized as focusing on the narrow human understanding of the concept of thought. For this reason I will argue that this flaw characterizes the various philosophical theories of artificial intelligence. On the one hand, functionalists, such as Fodor and Putnam, argue that “the psychology of a system depends” not on the physical architecture of a system, but on the neurons of the mind. brain or the wires of a computer, but rather how it is “assembled”. (Fodor 1981 p 114) Since they characterize mental states as functional states – input of stimuli and output of behavior... half of the article... the philosophy of mind" in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computer Science. Floridi, Ludiano (Ed.) Blackwell, pp 135-153Russell, Stuart J. and Norvig, Peter. (2010) Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (3rd ed.) Upper Saddle River. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, John ) “Minds, Brains, and Programs.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (3), pp 417-457 Searle, John (1984) Minds, Brains, and Science. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Snell, M. B. (2008) “You have the free will?" in the California Alumni magazine. March/April. Thagard, Paul. "Computing in the philosophy of science" in the Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing. Floridi, Ludiano. (Ed.) Blackwell, pp 307-318Turing, Alan. (1950) "Computing Machines and Intelligence." Mind, 59, pp 433-460. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1980) Observations on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol 1. Oxford: Blackwell.
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