The question of whether states are capable of acting morally in world politics remains an important concept of debate in international relations. In addressing the arguments for and against considering the status of states as moral agents in international relations, this essay will begin by considering how moral action can be attributed to the state. In assigning moral agency to states one conveys that states have the capacity – like individual citizens – to make moral judgments or actions and to be held accountable for such judgments or actions. However, states are not individuals in the human sphere when it comes to moral agency; rather they have been considered as institutions and collectives (Erskine, 2001) – as institutional actors within the international system. States are made up of individual citizens and represented by a collective of such citizens, who form different groups and bodies, of which a particular group of citizens is their representative: the government. Moral action has predominantly been assigned to the individual, however, the state can be considered simply a collective of its citizens – a collective of moral agents. States as Moral Agents There have been numerous authors who have argued that states have moral agency and the capacity or potential to perform moral duties (Erskine 2001, Hoover 2012, Schwenkenbecher 2011). The notion provided is that the state possesses a distinct identity – independent of the respective identities of citizens and collectives. States play a central role in the arena of international relations and in this context they seem to qualify as institutional moral agents (Erskine, 2001). Erskine proposes three criteria for determining the status of states as moral agents, which (halfway through the article (eohane, 1984). Keohane argues that if states are considered moral agents, then they are not responsible for the actions of citizens and therefore much more susceptible to the outcomes of collective decisions. There is a degree of ambiguity in whether the state holds moral duty with respect to its individual citizens. Schewenkenbecher (2011) suggests that a state's moral duty ultimately lies with individual citizens. representatives who contribute to the collective and achieve the desired outcome of the collective go further by questioning the "ability of the state to behave directly as a moral agent will always depend on how individuals and collectives of individuals choose to view it." therefore it is the moral agency of the state. the state will be bound to the moral action of its individuals and collectives.