"A general who wears down 180,000 enemies while expending 400,000 men... has something to answer for." This idea of ​​military historian CEW Bean is the main line of argument of traditionalist historians. They portray General Douglas Haig, British commander-in-chief of the BEF from 1915 to the end of the war in 1918, in a critical and damning light: a hopelessly incompetent general willing to sacrifice Britain's men for a few meters of muddy ground. Opposing this interpretation is a revisionist perspective of Haig as a thoughtful 'architect of victory', bringing long-term results with his perceptual strategies. With an examination of these two seemingly polemical perspectives and the primary evidence, it is possible to come to a judgment, albeit complex and multifaceted, both on these minor debates and on Douglas Haig's role in World War I: villain or winner? ContextA judgment about Haig cannot be reached without understanding the context. Haig, in today's society, is more commonly seen as a foolish "butcher" who failed to grasp the basics of the battlefield and proceeded to sacrifice the "flower of youth" of Britain. But to blindly accept this perspective is to misunderstand the complexities surrounding Haig's interpretations. We must realize that World War I was characterized by inherent contradictions: a war with unexpected 20th-century technology, a war of attrition rather than the traditional 19th-century war of movement. Commanders, including Haig, have struggled with the advent of modern warfare. This inflexibility is one of the main arguments of traditionalists: move it into a paragraph on the mini-debate on inflexibility, but then I'm not sure where the following paragraph fits, because it's... halfway down the paper...it didn't exist. ” However, when this information arrived the next morning, Haig told Rawlinson that "The enemy has no doubt been badly shaken and our correct line, therefore, is to press him hard with as little delay as possible." This military strategy led, as Terraine argued, to long-term success. The primary source for General Von Bulow's German Agenda of July 3 stated that “the decisive question of the war depends on… our victory on the Somme. We must win this battle..." . Haig's strategy also turns out to be acute and correct if we consider the reflections of Ludendorff, German chief of staff: "On the Western front we were completely exhausted... If the war lasted our defeat would have seemed inevitable... I cannot see as I look back how the German headquarters could have controlled the situation if the Allies had continued their attacks as they did 1916.”