Cheap Talk, Mediation and DiplomacyCASE 252: Coercive Diplomacy Before the Kosovo War: The American Approach in 1998 IntroductionThe concept of “cheap talk” focuses on analysis of how much information can be reliably relayed when communication is direct and free. Biased experts tend to share noisy information with decision makers. One way decision makers can improve information exchange is by extending communication. Additionally, he or she should try to seek advice from other experts. Ultimately, contracting with the expert can further increase the credibility of the information transmission. In theory, cheap chatter has no cost and is therefore not expected to have a significant impact on interstate communication outcomes. Unlike the cheap discourse model, standard “costly signaling” is expected to result in smoother information transmission between two actors in the international system. It is precisely the cost of reporting that gives validity to the information provided. As suggested by Farrell and Rabin, authors of the previous literature on cheap talk are divided in opinion. Some scholars argue that cheap talk is rather useless, while others believe that it is useful in interstate communication and can actually improve the benefits of both parties. When examining the literature on cheap talk, it is important to highlight additional international communication tools, such as diplomacy and mediation. Analysis of these issues provides great insight into the credibility of arguments regarding cheap talk. Numerous historical cases serve as examples of costly signaling and their outcomes, one of the most recent being the NATO show of force before... middle of paper... theoretical arguments about cheap talk, mediation and diplomacy are applicable to 1998 crisis in Kosovo. Before the military intervention, the NATO mediator attempted to communicate a peaceful agreement between the Yugoslav government and the Kosovars. Following the failure of coercive diplomacy formulated by the US National Security Council, we watched the defender opt for military intervention in the Balkan region. In other words, after Slobodan Milošević perceived the desire to use military capabilities as a bluff, the American executive led NATO in an organized violent campaign to end Serbian aggression in Kosovo. In theory, what caused NATO's military intervention was the combination of the challenger's disbelief towards the defender's threats and the defender's prejudiced position towards the challenger..