Topic > Vladimir Putin's Machiavellian Characteristics

Putin: The Modern MachiavelliIn March 2014, Ukraine's Crimean peninsula was annexed at the behest of a Machiavellian leader. A treaty signed by Vladimir Putin, president of the Russian Federation, meant the territory would become part of Russia when finalized in January 2015. Tensions between Ukraine and Russia increased after the March treaty. It's a widely contested issue – neither Ukraine nor the European Union recognize its legality – but the annexation gives a sense of the Russian president's character. Putin demonstrates several Machiavellian lines of thinking during his presidency and in the actions taken to protect Crimea. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay It is important to note the events preceding the annexation. The peninsula has had a history of Russian interference, starting in 1783 (“Annexation of Crimea 2014”). In 1954 the Soviet Union ceded it to become part of Ukraine, which was a Soviet republic at the time (Kramer). In 2014, Viktor Yanukovych, president of Ukraine, “fled the capital and was stripped of his presidential powers” ​​(“Annexation of Crimea 2014”) after failing to negotiate with those who opposed him. In the wake of the political turmoil, Putin subsequently ordered the mobilization of unmarked Russian soldiers to control the peninsula (Berry). In the following days, the Crimean parliament approved a referendum on secession from Ukraine. Ukraine's government and new president, Petro Poroshenko, believed that Russia's annexation was illegal and went against the Ukrainian constitution – a claim supported by the European Union and the United States. The annexation of Crimea, controlled and engineered by Vladimir Putin, was, summed up in a speech given before many applauding Russian statesmen, to “protect Russia's interests” (Myers and Barry). Putin's actions were decidedly Machiavellian in nature. Now, one can define the term "Machiavellian" in relation to the ideas found in Italian political writer Niccolò Machiavelli's The Prince, where he lists the qualities of the consummate ruler. The Prince gives the reader insight into the machinations behind success as a leader. These machinations define the term “Machiavellian” as the use of intentional deception, manipulation, cunning, and disregard for moral virtue. In a case where Machiavelli's predictions proved correct, Putin was able to easily “conquer” Crimea thanks to his past relationship with Russia; most of Crimea is ethnically and culturally Russian (“Annexation of Crimea 2014”). In The Prince Machiavelli writes that when "domains are acquired in a province that is not similar in language, customs and laws,...difficulties arise" (82). Since most Crimeans shared the same language and customs with Russia, as Machiavelli would explain, “men live peacefully as long as their old way of life is maintained and there is no change in customs” (81). It can be said that Putin used this fact to his advantage, stating in his Kremlin speech (Myers and Barry) that “Crimea has always been an integral part of Russia in the hearts and minds of the people”. Machiavelli goes on to discuss in Chapter V how to govern a newly acquired state. If a state is not completely destroyed and accustomed to living in freedom, it "maintains itself more easily by the means of its citizens than by any other way" (91). Putin does not heed Machiavelli's advice to completely destroy Crimea, as this would interfere with Russian economic interests and affect millionsof ethnic Russian people. Instead, Putin's power is intact thanks to the support of some Crimean citizens. In April 2014, “armed pro-Russian activists calling for a referendum… stormed and occupied a police station in Sloviansk, [vowing to] fight any Ukrainian forces sent” (Patrikarakos). Ethnic Russian support helped secure Putin's interests in Crimea. Another Machiavellian trait in relation to this is found in Putin's popularity among his people. Machiavelli writes: “a principality is constituted either by the people or by the nobility” (107). He states that “[achieving] the principality with the help of the nobility maintains it with more difficulty than one who becomes a prince with the help of the people” (108). Although the idea of ​​nobility is a bit archaic in modern times, this last part is still true, especially for Putin. When Putin was elected, he won with 64.7% of the vote (Herszenhorn). The majority of Russian voters elected him to power. Yet, Machiavelli writes “whoever becomes a prince with the support of the people must keep him as his friend; … [what] they ask of him is not to be oppressed” (109). In his speech in the Kremlin, Putin announced that the loss of Crimea in 1954 was a “historic injustice” to the Russian people (Myers and Barry). With his use of rhetoric, Putin claimed that the annexation of Crimea would right the wrongs inflicted – a statement that was followed by “thunderous applause, standing ovations and [singing]” (Myers and Barry). In the eyes of the people, Putin was the liberator from oppression. This is Machiavellian in nature as Putin has strategically used this aspect to maintain his control and power, as well as gain momentum in support of the annexation of Crimea and boost Russian morale. Furthermore, Putin displays Machiavellian aspects regarding deception. Machiavelli states that “[great] princes…are those who have cared little about keeping their promises” (133). In chapter XVIII of The Prince he explains how manipulation and cunning are qualities that contribute to success. Machiavelli writes that when princes use these characteristics, they “ultimately [surpass] those who founded their foundation on honesty” (133). In November 2014, an article in the London Daily Telegraph stated that UK Prime Minister David Cameron was disappointed that Putin was deceptive, lying and failing to keep promises. Cameron claims that the Russian president “has not kept his promise to respect the ceasefire in Ukraine” (Swinford). Putin demonstrates that through lying and deception, generally seen as negative qualities in a ruler, he protects Russia's interests in the region and continues to mobilize troops. Furthermore, Putin refused to acknowledge the presence of unmarked Russian soldiers on the Crimean peninsula. He claimed that “the heavily armed men were 'local self-defense forces'” (Chappell and Memmott). Eventually, Putin admitted that those heavily armed men were in fact Russians, and told the media that “everything Russia did… was part of a humanitarian mission to protect the Russians in Crimea” (Chappell and Memmott). Under the guise of helping oppressed ethnic Russians, something that ordinary people want from their leader, as already mentioned, Putin has been able to annex valuable lands with relative international impunity and without any interference from other world powers. In Chapter XIX of The Prince, Machiavelli explains how a prince's actions can lead to him being despised or hated, and Putin avoids this through the use of visual propaganda. To celebrate Putin's sixty-second birthday, an artist was commissioned to create twelve portraits of the president performing twelve difficult tasks à,.