The paradoxical question of the definition of academic freedom in Wyman's Sweezy V. The State of Nh higher education. First Amendment protections afforded to both students and teachers safeguard the quality of higher education. The paradoxical question of defining academic freedom began in 1957, when the Supreme Court mixed “professional ideology” (Byrne, 1987, p. 256) with the constitutional protections afforded by the First Amendment. Byrne (1987) states “. . . this paradox should . . . [To be] . . . neither collateral nor embarrassing; academic discourse benefits from the tension between a scholar's independent judgment and the university's assessment of his or her professional competence” (p. 258) in Sweezy v. the State of NH by Wyman. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay By analyzing the procedural history surrounding both government intrusion and the line between academic freedom and institutional authority, this document will create a comprehensive roadmap to avoid violations of academic freedom for a public institution of higher education. Per Kaplin and Lee (2014), “Whether employed at public or private institutions of higher education, faculty as citizens are protected by the First Amendment from government censorship and other government actions that infringe on the freedoms of speech, press and citizens' freedom". association" (p. 275). Procedural History and Governmental Intrusion Sweezy v. the State of NH by Wyman, 354 US 234, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311 (1957), appellant sued in court and testified before the Attorney General regarding his suspected Communist Party affiliation. Over the course of several hours, the petitioner refused to answer several questions stating “. subject under consideration as well as those that transgress the limits of the First Amendment” (Id. p. 1206). After refusing to answer questions, the petitioner was held in contempt jurisprudence has made progress over the past 59 years, the Court continues to praise the value of academic freedom without providing a formal definition. Byrne (1987), suggests that “[t]he gross imbalance between praise and rule suggests extreme reluctance or difficulty. for a court to find that any particular practice constitutes a violation of academic freedom" (p. 257). “The First Amendment guarantee of academic freedom rests on recognition of the vital role in a democracy played by those who lead and train its young people.” 73 ALR6th 281 (originally published 2012). Academic freedom flows from the First Amendment right to free speech, and while this right is extremely important, the balance between institutional autonomy and academic freedom must be narrowly defined. Academic freedom issues range from academic discourse to course content development and assessment practices. In Keyishian v. Bd. of the Regents of the Univ. of New York State, 385 US 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967), faculty members of the State University of New York filed a motion for relief and injunctive relief alleging that the administrative rules violated constitutional guarantees. Here the court emphasized that “the (p)recision of regulationit must be the touchstone in an area that so closely touches our precious freedoms. . . (f)o the standards of permissible legal vagueness are rigorous in the context of freedom of expression. . . First Amendment freedoms need breathing room to survive; the government can only regulate with narrow specificity” (Id. at 604). Freedom of Speech, Expression and ConductIn Franklin v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 172 Cal. App. 3d 322, 218 Cal. Rptr. 228 (Ct. App. 1985), plaintiff Bruce H. Franklin, a leader in the antiwar movement and tenured professor at Stanford University, filed suit against the University after the university discharged him. Here the court states that “[a]ny words spoken, in the classroom, in the dining hall, or on campus, that differ from another person's views may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take that risk. .only expressive conduct that materially disrupts classroom work or results in substantial disruption or invasion of the rights of others, which is not protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech” (Id. at 337). These statements along with an after-class meeting organized by the Bishop to discuss the “Evidence of God in Human Physiology” (Id. at 1069), which had been scheduled during the week of final exams, provoked complaints from the students. In response to the complaints, the university advisor drafted a memorandum entitled “Religious Activities in a Public Institution,” which states that “[a]mon those actions that should be discontinued are: 1) the insertion of beliefs and /or religious preferences during periods of instruction and 2) electives where a “Christian perspective” of an academic topic is delivered. . . I must also remind you that religious beliefs and/or the strength of a belief may not be used in decisions regarding the recruitment, admission, or retention of doctoral students” (Id. at 1069). In this case, the appeals court recognized the obstacle described as “the First Amendment razor's edge” that the University faced. The Court states that “[o]ur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which has transcendent value for all of us and not just for the teachers involved. . . Nowhere is the vigilant protection of constitutional liberties more vital than in the American school community. . . The future of the Nation depends on leaders trained through broad exposure to the robust exchange of ideas that uncovers truth from a multitude of languages, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection” (Id. at 1075). The importance of academic freedom cannot be overlooked, however, the Court here recognized the importance of university autonomy by stating that "[t]his Court should honor the traditional reluctance to impinge on the prerogatives of state and local educational institutions" ( Id. at 1075). Academic freedom is an important safeguard that ensures that the value of an education is not diminished by unnecessary or unreasonable restrictions. Here the Court found that, based on the nature of the speech and the narrowly defined restrictions, the First Amendment right to academic freedom had not been violated. In Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), a substitute teacher at NIU, a state university, filed a complaint under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1985 alleging that misrepresentations made by defendants led to the decision of 'University not to summarize it. Clark, during the period of his temporary employment, pushed the issue of sex education as part of the health survey course. Here the court held that although the right toacademic freedom “one of the rights listed in the First Amendment. . . [it is not]. . . a license of uncontrolled expression, inconsistent with established curricular content and internally destructive of the proper functioning of the institution” (Id. at 931). Here the Court rejected Clark's claim, because “the legitimate interests of the State may limit a teacher's right to say what he wants” (Id. at 931). Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, in Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F. 2d 1066, showcases the paradoxical phenomenon described by Byrne (1987). In the case of Bishop v. Aronov, an assistant professor of physical education filed a lawsuit under 42 USC § 1983 in federal district court after a university policy was adopted to regulate the flow of religious speech. Phillip Bishop, Plaintiff/Appellant was employed from 1984 to 1987 at the University of Alabama at the College of Education, working with both undergraduate and graduate students. Bishop frequently referenced his religious belief system during lectures, both in a generalized context and by providing detailed philosophical explanations. Bishop is quoted as saying: "[After thinking about it carefully, I have decided for myself when I die, I would like to leave behind something more important and valuable than a pile of technical documents. I think people are important and eternal, paper is not It's neither. I want to invest my time primarily in people. I personally believe that God came to earth in the form of Jesus Christ and has something to tell us about life that is crucial to success and happiness." Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1068 (11th Cir. 1991).In Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1989), the plaintiff in this case filed a rights action civilians after his teaching contract at Tennessee State University was not renewed, Pirate was appointed associate professor for the 1982 academic year for teaching in the Department of Civil Engineering , a master's degree and a doctorate in the field of engineering from various universities in Europe and Asia. The Pirates position at Tennessee State University was an annually renewable tenure-track contract. Parade presented its students with specific grading guidelines, providing students with the opportunity to document extenuating circumstances to increase their grade. In his first course, two students requested a grade change. The first student provided a detailed, documented account of a legal matter, Parate bumped this student from a B to an A. Parate denied the second student due to his false medical reports, and Parate personally observed him cheat on the final exam. When Parate refused, this student turned to the Dean of the Faculty of Engineering. Edward I Isibor, was dean of the Faculty of Engineering. Isibor and the second student were both Nigerian. After receiving the student's appeal, Isibor forced Parate to meet with him, at which point Parate was informed that he had to change his grading scale, allowing a grade of 86% to be an A. Upon Parate's refusal, this Isibor insulted, berated, and threatened Parate, stating that “it would be difficult to renew Parate's contract at TSU” (Kaplin & Lee, 2013, p. 269). The next day Parate met with the associate dean who had prepared a memorandum stating that grades for both students would be changed from Bs to A's and that the official grading scale would also reflect the percentage changes. Parate refused to sign the memorandum as he was preparing to add a notation that these changes were "instructionsdean and department head during the meeting" (Kaplin & Lee, 2013, p. 269). “Samuchin . . . explained to Parate that there should be no note referring to Isibor's instructions. . . [he] advised Parate that if he had not signed the retyped memoranda, Isibor would have “ruined” his assessment.” Although Parate ultimately signed the memorandums as required, he did under duress and out of fear of retaliation. Over the next two academic years Isibor and Samuchin, the associate dean, acted retaliatory against Parate on multiple occasions. They “challenged Parate's grading criteria in other courses, they sent a letter critical of his teaching methods; and penalized him with poor performance ratings hindered Parate's research efforts and his presentation of papers at professional conferences. . . and recommended that Parate's teaching contract not be renewed” (Kaplin & Lee, 2013, p. 269). In March 1985, Parate was informed that his tenured position would not be renewed. In a meeting with Isibor in September 1985 he was informed that “. . . if Parate's performance improved, the renewal of the teaching contract would be considered. Isibor concluded by telling Parate “you must obey and never disobey your principal”” (Kaplin & Lee, 2013, p. 270). During late September and early October 1985, Isibor and Samuchin took several discriminatory actions in retaliation after two other Nigerian students complained about Parate's grading system. Isibor and Samuchin demoted Parate in front of the students, removed him from his teaching position, and forced him to take the course he had previously taught. Parate was shortly thereafter informed that his tenured position would not be renewed. Parate filed this action under 42 USC § 1983, alleging a violation of his right to academic freedom under First Amendment protections. Similarly, in Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 78 (3d Cir. 2001), 3rd Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals discusses application of academic freedom to grading practices and procedures. In the case Brown v. Armenti, plaintiff Robert Brown, a professor employed for 28 years at the University of California in Pennsylvania, filed a lawsuit alleging that he was unfairly discharged after he refused to change a grade assigned to one of his students. The plaintiff alleged that the retaliation violated his First Amendment right to academic freedom. Here the court applied the standard adopted in Pickering v. Board of Education and Tinker v. Des Moines stating that “essentially [the] freedom in the American university community is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy played by those who lead and train our young people. Imposing a straightjacket on intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would endanger the future of our nation” (id. at 74). Brown, defines the rights of a professor within the classroom in which the professor essentially puts himself in the shoes of the University “fulfills one of the functions that concern the four essential freedoms of the University: choosing who can teach, what can be taught, how it must be taught and who can be admitted to studies" (Id. at 75). Brown differs from Parate, concluding that student grading has not risen to a level that requires judicial intervention. Apply jurisprudence Government interference Academic freedom is both a right of the university vs.

Topic > The paradoxical question of the definition of academic freedom in Wyman's Sweezy V. The State of Nh higher education. First Amendment protections afforded to both students and teachers safeguard the quality of higher education. The paradoxical question of defining academic freedom began in 1957, when the Supreme Court mixed “professional ideology” (Byrne, 1987, p. 256) with the constitutional protections afforded by the First Amendment. Byrne (1987) states “. . . this paradox should . . . [To be] . . . neither collateral nor embarrassing; academic discourse benefits from the tension between a scholar's independent judgment and the university's assessment of his or her professional competence” (p. 258) in Sweezy v. the State of NH by Wyman. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay By analyzing the procedural history surrounding both government intrusion and the line between academic freedom and institutional authority, this document will create a comprehensive roadmap to avoid violations of academic freedom for a public institution of higher education. Per Kaplin and Lee (2014), “Whether employed at public or private institutions of higher education, faculty as citizens are protected by the First Amendment from government censorship and other government actions that infringe on the freedoms of speech, press and citizens' freedom". association" (p. 275). Procedural History and Governmental Intrusion Sweezy v. the State of NH by Wyman, 354 US 234, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311 (1957), appellant sued in court and testified before the Attorney General regarding his suspected Communist Party affiliation. Over the course of several hours, the petitioner refused to answer several questions stating “. subject under consideration as well as those that transgress the limits of the First Amendment” (Id. p. 1206). After refusing to answer questions, the petitioner was held in contempt jurisprudence has made progress over the past 59 years, the Court continues to praise the value of academic freedom without providing a formal definition. Byrne (1987), suggests that “[t]he gross imbalance between praise and rule suggests extreme reluctance or difficulty. for a court to find that any particular practice constitutes a violation of academic freedom" (p. 257). “The First Amendment guarantee of academic freedom rests on recognition of the vital role in a democracy played by those who lead and train its young people.” 73 ALR6th 281 (originally published 2012). Academic freedom flows from the First Amendment right to free speech, and while this right is extremely important, the balance between institutional autonomy and academic freedom must be narrowly defined. Academic freedom issues range from academic discourse to course content development and assessment practices. In Keyishian v. Bd. of the Regents of the Univ. of New York State, 385 US 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967), faculty members of the State University of New York filed a motion for relief and injunctive relief alleging that the administrative rules violated constitutional guarantees. Here the court emphasized that “the (p)recision of regulationit must be the touchstone in an area that so closely touches our precious freedoms. . . (f)o the standards of permissible legal vagueness are rigorous in the context of freedom of expression. . . First Amendment freedoms need breathing room to survive; the government can only regulate with narrow specificity” (Id. at 604). Freedom of Speech, Expression and ConductIn Franklin v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 172 Cal. App. 3d 322, 218 Cal. Rptr. 228 (Ct. App. 1985), plaintiff Bruce H. Franklin, a leader in the antiwar movement and tenured professor at Stanford University, filed suit against the University after the university discharged him. Here the court states that “[a]ny words spoken, in the classroom, in the dining hall, or on campus, that differ from another person's views may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take that risk. .only expressive conduct that materially disrupts classroom work or results in substantial disruption or invasion of the rights of others, which is not protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech” (Id. at 337). These statements along with an after-class meeting organized by the Bishop to discuss the “Evidence of God in Human Physiology” (Id. at 1069), which had been scheduled during the week of final exams, provoked complaints from the students. In response to the complaints, the university advisor drafted a memorandum entitled “Religious Activities in a Public Institution,” which states that “[a]mon those actions that should be discontinued are: 1) the insertion of beliefs and /or religious preferences during periods of instruction and 2) electives where a “Christian perspective” of an academic topic is delivered. . . I must also remind you that religious beliefs and/or the strength of a belief may not be used in decisions regarding the recruitment, admission, or retention of doctoral students” (Id. at 1069). In this case, the appeals court recognized the obstacle described as “the First Amendment razor's edge” that the University faced. The Court states that “[o]ur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which has transcendent value for all of us and not just for the teachers involved. . . Nowhere is the vigilant protection of constitutional liberties more vital than in the American school community. . . The future of the Nation depends on leaders trained through broad exposure to the robust exchange of ideas that uncovers truth from a multitude of languages, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection” (Id. at 1075). The importance of academic freedom cannot be overlooked, however, the Court here recognized the importance of university autonomy by stating that "[t]his Court should honor the traditional reluctance to impinge on the prerogatives of state and local educational institutions" ( Id. at 1075). Academic freedom is an important safeguard that ensures that the value of an education is not diminished by unnecessary or unreasonable restrictions. Here the Court found that, based on the nature of the speech and the narrowly defined restrictions, the First Amendment right to academic freedom had not been violated. In Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), a substitute teacher at NIU, a state university, filed a complaint under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1985 alleging that misrepresentations made by defendants led to the decision of 'University not to summarize it. Clark, during the period of his temporary employment, pushed the issue of sex education as part of the health survey course. Here the court held that although the right toacademic freedom “one of the rights listed in the First Amendment. . . [it is not]. . . a license of uncontrolled expression, inconsistent with established curricular content and internally destructive of the proper functioning of the institution” (Id. at 931). Here the Court rejected Clark's claim, because “the legitimate interests of the State may limit a teacher's right to say what he wants” (Id. at 931). Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, in Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F. 2d 1066, showcases the paradoxical phenomenon described by Byrne (1987). In the case of Bishop v. Aronov, an assistant professor of physical education filed a lawsuit under 42 USC § 1983 in federal district court after a university policy was adopted to regulate the flow of religious speech. Phillip Bishop, Plaintiff/Appellant was employed from 1984 to 1987 at the University of Alabama at the College of Education, working with both undergraduate and graduate students. Bishop frequently referenced his religious belief system during lectures, both in a generalized context and by providing detailed philosophical explanations. Bishop is quoted as saying: "[After thinking about it carefully, I have decided for myself when I die, I would like to leave behind something more important and valuable than a pile of technical documents. I think people are important and eternal, paper is not It's neither. I want to invest my time primarily in people. I personally believe that God came to earth in the form of Jesus Christ and has something to tell us about life that is crucial to success and happiness." Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1068 (11th Cir. 1991).In Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1989), the plaintiff in this case filed a rights action civilians after his teaching contract at Tennessee State University was not renewed, Pirate was appointed associate professor for the 1982 academic year for teaching in the Department of Civil Engineering , a master's degree and a doctorate in the field of engineering from various universities in Europe and Asia. The Pirates position at Tennessee State University was an annually renewable tenure-track contract. Parade presented its students with specific grading guidelines, providing students with the opportunity to document extenuating circumstances to increase their grade. In his first course, two students requested a grade change. The first student provided a detailed, documented account of a legal matter, Parate bumped this student from a B to an A. Parate denied the second student due to his false medical reports, and Parate personally observed him cheat on the final exam. When Parate refused, this student turned to the Dean of the Faculty of Engineering. Edward I Isibor, was dean of the Faculty of Engineering. Isibor and the second student were both Nigerian. After receiving the student's appeal, Isibor forced Parate to meet with him, at which point Parate was informed that he had to change his grading scale, allowing a grade of 86% to be an A. Upon Parate's refusal, this Isibor insulted, berated, and threatened Parate, stating that “it would be difficult to renew Parate's contract at TSU” (Kaplin & Lee, 2013, p. 269). The next day Parate met with the associate dean who had prepared a memorandum stating that grades for both students would be changed from Bs to A's and that the official grading scale would also reflect the percentage changes. Parate refused to sign the memorandum as he was preparing to add a notation that these changes were "instructionsdean and department head during the meeting" (Kaplin & Lee, 2013, p. 269). “Samuchin . . . explained to Parate that there should be no note referring to Isibor's instructions. . . [he] advised Parate that if he had not signed the retyped memoranda, Isibor would have “ruined” his assessment.” Although Parate ultimately signed the memorandums as required, he did under duress and out of fear of retaliation. Over the next two academic years Isibor and Samuchin, the associate dean, acted retaliatory against Parate on multiple occasions. They “challenged Parate's grading criteria in other courses, they sent a letter critical of his teaching methods; and penalized him with poor performance ratings hindered Parate's research efforts and his presentation of papers at professional conferences. . . and recommended that Parate's teaching contract not be renewed” (Kaplin & Lee, 2013, p. 269). In March 1985, Parate was informed that his tenured position would not be renewed. In a meeting with Isibor in September 1985 he was informed that “. . . if Parate's performance improved, the renewal of the teaching contract would be considered. Isibor concluded by telling Parate “you must obey and never disobey your principal”” (Kaplin & Lee, 2013, p. 270). During late September and early October 1985, Isibor and Samuchin took several discriminatory actions in retaliation after two other Nigerian students complained about Parate's grading system. Isibor and Samuchin demoted Parate in front of the students, removed him from his teaching position, and forced him to take the course he had previously taught. Parate was shortly thereafter informed that his tenured position would not be renewed. Parate filed this action under 42 USC § 1983, alleging a violation of his right to academic freedom under First Amendment protections. Similarly, in Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 78 (3d Cir. 2001), 3rd Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals discusses application of academic freedom to grading practices and procedures. In the case Brown v. Armenti, plaintiff Robert Brown, a professor employed for 28 years at the University of California in Pennsylvania, filed a lawsuit alleging that he was unfairly discharged after he refused to change a grade assigned to one of his students. The plaintiff alleged that the retaliation violated his First Amendment right to academic freedom. Here the court applied the standard adopted in Pickering v. Board of Education and Tinker v. Des Moines stating that “essentially [the] freedom in the American university community is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy played by those who lead and train our young people. Imposing a straightjacket on intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would endanger the future of our nation” (id. at 74). Brown, defines the rights of a professor within the classroom in which the professor essentially puts himself in the shoes of the University “fulfills one of the functions that concern the four essential freedoms of the University: choosing who can teach, what can be taught, how it must be taught and who can be admitted to studies" (Id. at 75). Brown differs from Parate, concluding that student grading has not risen to a level that requires judicial intervention. Apply jurisprudence Government interference Academic freedom is both a right of the university vs.