Index IntroductionDefinition of Forward-Looking InformationTheoretical FrameworkAgency TheorySignaling TheoryLegitimacy Theory: Literature Review and Existing ProblemIntroductionForward-Looking Information (FLD) is receiving an increasing volume of attention in current information related studies all over the world. The frequency of FLDs disclosed by organizations is one of the measures to increase the effectiveness of the capital market by reducing information asymmetry. The current role of the FLD in the financial atmosphere is so critical because money markets are too quick to depend only on historical records. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay Past corporate disclosures do not meet the diverse information needs of financial development stakeholders. Stakeholders of companies often want to know the upcoming forecasts of companies in the logic of what will happen to companies in the future. Company management evaluates current market trends to respond to stakeholders with descriptions of what companies are planning and proposing to do. So FLDs have become a very worrying issue for the regulatory body. FLDs contain information related to economic and non-economic forecasts of companies that influence future performance for future business uncertainty, sudden risk, evaluation and analysis, agency relationship and relevant information information of companies. In reference to the IFRS practices report, the FLD should be included in management comments to reduce information asymmetry. Companies disclose corporate information in a variety of ways, such as annual reports, conference call press releases, interim reports, and legal communications from specialists. With reference to these sources, the annual report was used for this study. Since annual reports are the preferred source of information, annual reports are believed to be a significant, primary and frequent source of information compared to all other sources for users in developing and developed countries. In addition to this, the annual reports are verified, timely, accurate and consistent, supported by previous studies. The aim of the study is to investigate the nature and extent of FLD in listed companies of DS30 index and identify the factors of forward-looking information in Bangladesh. A study by Kieso et al. (2009) stated that FLDs are beneficial to stakeholders in their policy making process. FLD is considered a dependent variable because shareholders seem to pay more attention to the company's future forecasts than its previous performance. In this study, the hypothesis on the association between FLD and firm characteristics influencing disclosure plans monitored by managers in Bangladeshi Enterprises was developed. Mainly this study affirms the effect of firm characteristics on FLD released in the administration comments. To this end, firm characteristics are taken into account through a comprehensive review of relevant disclosure literature because they have a direct influence on FLD. This analysis contributes to previous studies on disclosure approaches by presenting that firm characteristics influence the FLD recorded in management explanations. Furthermore, FLD signals to the market some probable and unlikely events close to the company. FLDs provide information on upcoming strategies and schemes that provide concrete feedback to themarket. A study by Aljifri & Hussainey (2007) investigated FLD factors in company annual reports. The study highlights the factors of FLD by non-economic companies registered in the NSE. The results specify that companies with good performance, greater accountability and with greater attention to external investments include more FLDs in their annual reports. In contrast, cross-listed organizations are linked to fewer FLDs. It is noted that there are very limitednumber of articles have studied the influence of firm characteristics on FLDs in developing and developed countries. To the best of the author's knowledge, no study has yet examined this topic in Bangladesh. Furthermore, the study contributes to the present literature by classifying FLD as both qualitative and quantitative FLD. Furthermore, the judgment on the extent of FLD recorded by Bangladeshi companies will add value to the capital market and help understand the drivers of FLD in Bangladesh. Definition of Forward-Looking Information Forward-looking information refers to future predictions and current plans that provide information about the company's future prospects. There are two types of information published in annual reports, such as “retrospective information and forward-looking information”. Retrospective information means past financial results and information related to them." Because the business environment is too dynamic to depend only on backward-looking information, public companies will publish forward-looking information about their future prospects. Forward-looking information (FLD) is theoretically uninformative if it does not change from the previous year, especially after a major change in company performance. The FLD includes economic estimates such as next year's income, expected cash flows, probable revenues, etc. FLD also includes non-financial information such as risks, organizational plans, assessments of possibilities, uncertainties and estimated data that largely influence actual results compared to expected objectives. The terms “estimate,” “expect,” “predict,” “anticipate,” “anticipate,” or other similar terminology are used to identify FLD. In many cases, retrospective information can be considered forward-looking information because it conveys messages for the future. future. For example, capital spending was increased by 5% last year, as indicated in the CEO reports in the company's annual reports, this statement absolutely denotes retrospective information. Furthermore, it indicates that capital spending is expected to increase in the next cash flows. In reference to the ICAEW (2003), FLD covers any disclosure that affects subsequent financial statements. A study by Bujaki et al. (1999) defined the nature of FLD and identified that this type of information can be qualitative, quantitative, economic or non-economic. The FLD would be significant in estimating the level to which the company's performance, liquidity and financial position may vary in the future. Theoretical Framework Forward-looking information disclosed by companies has significant benefits for companies and managers. Three theoretical methods explain these benefits for managers and companies: agency theory, legitimacy theory, and signaling theory. Previous research has explored numerous propositions provided by signaling agency theory to explain the association of firm characteristics with FLD. To recognize the factors of FLD, these three theories are used extensively. Agency Theory Agency theory explains the affiliation between the agent (manager) and the principal (shareholders). It is assumed that management andthe separation of ownership causes agency costs that create information asymmetry. Information asymmetry occurs when agents exploit superior information opportunities than principals. Agency theory predicts that agency costs will differ across different firm characteristics, such as leverage, size, and listing status. It also proposes that highly leveraged firms disclose more FLDs to reduce agency costs and the cost of capital. Referring to this theory, FLD decreases agency costs and reduces information asymmetry. Firms provide a higher level of FLD which supports a higher assessment of firms' future performance. Signaling theory To understand the factors of FLD, signaling theory is widely used. It was developed to explain labor market behavior for voluntary corporate disclosures. The manager provides good performance news voluntarily to signal the good news to avoid the bad news, and the manager reveals the bad news to signal his own strengths and capabilities to eliminate future losses. According to this theory, firms will disclose FLDs to signal to the capital market to reduce information asymmetry, increase firm value, and mitigate financial costs. Signaling theory describes that managers provide FLD within annual reports to signal potential users of the reports. Legitimacy Theory: Another theoretical method used to define forward-looking information is legitimacy theory. Previous studies used legitimacy theory to express FLD in environmental and social reporting. Legitimacy theory ensures that companies signal their legitimacy by providing FLD annually. Literature Review and Existing Problem The consequences of firm characteristics on FLD have been evaluated in many previous studies, and the topic has gained significant attention in the theoretical literature. However, the experimental indication on the outcome of the exact attributes of the company on FLD is not defined and fails to provide conclusive results. FLD is considered a subclass of stakeholder- and company-focused corporate disclosure planning that records high-quality information and contains FLD in annual reports. FLD is required and needed by stakeholders outside of book value and recent earnings which helps them plan for future performance. Much past research on FLD has focused on the association between FLD and firm characteristics. Menicucci (2013) examines the association between the extent of FLD and firm characteristics in management explanations of Italian firms. The result showed that profitability (ROA) has a substantially negative association with FLD, while financial leverage and firm size have an insignificant association with the magnitude of FLD. But another study by Menicucci (2013) investigates the factors of FLD in the management explanation of the annual report of Italian listed companies. This study indicates that profitability (ROA) has a significant association with the level of FLD, but financial leverage and firm size are not important for interpreting the magnitude of FLD. In this case Sullivan et al. (2008) discussed the corporate governance context to reveal a sample of FLD coverage of Australian companies. The result of the study shows that in 2000, corporate governance mechanisms are generally higher for companies disclosing FLD than for companies not disclosing information. But the results do not show the same result in 2002 and suggest that the increase in efficiency of.