Aristotle dedicates the first six books of his Nicomachean Ethics to the discussion of virtue. He thus divides virtue into two different categories: moral virtue and intellectual virtue and discusses them individually. However, in our approach to the question of the highest moral virtue, we will examine moral and intellectual virtue together (rather than separately) in order not only to discern what Aristotle believes this virtue to be, but also to examine whether or not there is a connection between the two different types of virtue. Although Aristotle believes that moral virtues are of extreme importance, we will find that even the highest of moral virtues could not exist if it were not for intellectual virtues. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original EssayAccording to Aristotle, intellectual virtues develop through teaching and instruction while moral virtues develop through practice or force of habit. Moral virtues are not instilled in us naturally; the soul is destined to receive the moral virtues, but to develop into guiding forces they must be nourished by habit. The soul acquires moral virtue by exercising it, just as the harpist learns to play the harp by playing it and men become builders by building houses (1103a14-1103b2). A morally virtuous character is not determined by thought, but rather through action. The next thing Aristotle believes we need to understand about virtue is the concept of moderation. First he notes that the nature of moral qualities is destroyed by both defect and excess (1104a12-13). As an example of this, Aristotle notes that both too much and too little food and drink destroy our health, while the proportionate amount increases and preserves it. Applying these doctrines to virtue, Aristotle believes that the man who avoids everything becomes a coward while the man who knows no fear becomes reckless. In all things, virtue represents a middle ground between too much and too little (1104a15-27). Aristotle concludes the second book with a warning about referring to the virtuous mean as the opposite of one of the extremes rather than the middle ground between them. . If we were to take some examples from the third book, we might be inclined to say that courage is the opposite of cowardice and that temperance is the opposite of licentiousness. This, according to Aristotle, is an erroneous statement, as can be demonstrated by the following diagram: Temerity ------- Courage ------- Cowardice In drawing a line diagram like the one we see above, it is in reality is recklessness, rather than courage which is the opposite of cowardice. Courage, rather, is the middle ground or virtue between the two vices. While we might be inclined to make claims to the contrary, virtue in all things is what the middle seeks. The next thing we need to understand about virtue comes from Book Three, which deals with what Aristotle calls voluntary and involuntary actions. All morally virtuous conduct is rooted in voluntary action. Aristotle writes that an involuntary action is one performed under compulsion or ignorance, while a voluntary action is one in which the initiative rests with the agent who knows the particular circumstances in which the action is performed (1111a21-4). An act is completely involuntary only when its sole cause is not the person performing it, but an external force or person (e.g., a person pushes you from behind against another person) (1110a1-5). Other forms of involuntary action are acts performed out of ignorance (when the person is ignorant of the particular situation) or out of ignorance (when an action is performed due to drunkenness or immorality) (1110b15-35). Voluntary action, on the other hand,implies a choice. Aristotle carefully distinguishes choice from opinion and argues that true choice implies that the person choosing can determine that action is preferable to another (1112a2-15). Therefore, the concept of choice also implies deliberation when we find ourselves in a situation where the most preferable action is unclear. According to Aristotle we never deliberate about ends, but rather take ends for granted and deliberate about how to achieve the best ends (1112b32-35). Since the object of deliberation and the object of choice are the same for Aristotle (1113a3), and since we can only deliberate between options that are in our power (1112a32), a choice must be considered a revision of the things that are in our power ( 1113a10-14). Those who have a good character will always aim for the good when choosing. However, those who do not have good character may understand things incorrectly and may only want what they believe is good. Both good and vice, therefore, are within human power, and it is very possible that people willfully choose vice. If we denied this, we would also have to deny that man is the source of his own actions (1113b8-21). Aristotle supports this explanation through an examination of how legislators reward those who act nobly and punish those who do evil (except evil that is done under some compulsion or due to ignorance that exists without any guilt). Just as people are responsible for their own bad actions, they are also responsible for their own moral state. If someone falls into a bad moral condition, it is his fault if he leads a bad life (1113b21-9). Knowing Aristotle's requirements for obtaining moral virtue is extremely important because it has a direct impact on the relationship between moral and intellectual virtue. The relationship between moral and intellectual virtue is discussed at length in the sixth book. He begins the sixth book by returning to his fundamental premise that virtue is distinguished from vice by voluntary action involving a certain level of reasoning. Reasoning occurs through deliberation and choice as described above. According to Aristotle there are five intellectual virtues: science, art, practical wisdom, intellect and theoretical wisdom. Of these five virtues, pay most attention to practical wisdom. He argues that practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue of the same part of the soul that forms opinions, and that, unlike art (which is about production and results in an object distinct from the manufacturing process), practical wisdom is about the realm of action where doing good is in itself an end. Therefore, practical wisdom is an intellectual virtue that allows us to grasp the truth about human action. The characteristic of a prudent person is that he deliberates well not only about what is good and advantageous in a particular situation, but also about what is conductive to the good life in general (1140a25-28). Whoever deliberates well, according to Aristotle, deliberates correctly, and this correctness restricts deliberation to activities that allow one to arrive at a good (1142b8-22). Previously, we found that Aristotle established this type of correct deliberation as a prerequisite for arriving at moral virtue, so it logically follows that for a person to be truly good he must be able to deliberate well and, therefore, have practical wisdom. However, a problem would necessarily arise if an evil man used practical wisdom and the power of deliberation to arrive at something evil. Aristotle responds to this objection by citing a difference between practical wisdom and what he calls knavery. Both practical wisdom and cunning are the power to take those steps that lead to a goal we have set for ourselves. The crucial difference is thatpractical wisdom implies a certain vision of the good as it appears to the virtuous person, while cunning does not necessarily result in a good end (1144a29-37). Based on Aristotle's definition of what would be necessary to arrive at moral virtue, it would seem that one cannot arrive at moral virtue unless one first possesses the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom. Moral virtue is learned through the voluntary performance of morally virtuous activities, and for an action to be voluntary, it necessarily involves deliberation. However, Aristotle's arguments about practical wisdom seem to suggest that the imprudent man would be incapable of such deliberation, because deliberative excellence is the mark of practical wisdom. Therefore, one should teach the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom before one can practice any of the moral virtues. On the other hand, the only difference between "practical wisdom" and "cunning" is the goal each seeks to achieve. Practical wisdom involves deliberation toward goals that are said to be “good,” while cunning is deliberation toward goals that are said to be “bad.” However, it would seem that a person needs a certain amount of moral virtue to distinguish between which goal is "good" and "bad". This forces us to conclude that practical wisdom requires moral virtue and we are left with a circular argument. Aristotle responds to this objection by showing that just as practical wisdom and cunning are similar, there is a similarity in what he calls "natural virtue." and “virtue in the full sense” (1144b3-4). Note that from the moment of our birth we all tend to possess a certain level of virtue, however, we tend to look for something in addition to what we are born with. The virtue we seek is what he calls "virtue in the full sense" and he argues that it is not possible to achieve this virtue without practical wisdom. Aristotle states that if we were to attempt to achieve moral virtue without practical wisdom, the action would be similar to "a mighty body which, moving without vision, comes to a mighty fall" (1144b10-20). Aristotle concludes Book Six by arguing that virtue in the full sense of the term cannot be achieved without practical wisdom, and argues that this definition has led some people to believe that all virtues are forms of practical wisdom. Most important in this review of practical wisdom and moral virtue is his claim that virtue is a characteristic guided by “right reason,” which is determined by practical wisdom (1144b16–24). However, Aristotle finds it necessary to go beyond this simple redefinition and goes on to argue that right reason in moral matters is practical wisdom. Therefore, right reason is what makes us virtuous, and we can logically conclude that once we possess the one intellectual virtue of practical wisdom, we will possess all moral virtues (1145a2-4). Now that we have a solid understanding of virtue, we can return to the question of moral virtue. Aristotle dedicates part of the third book and all of the fourth book describing the different moral virtues through the application of his concept of average. However, none of these virtues receives as much attention as the virtue of justice, which is discussed throughout the text of Book Five. It is not surprising that he gives so much space to his discussion of justice, because for Aristotle justice is the highest of the moral virtues. For Aristotle there are two different types of justice: universal justice and particular justice. For our purposes, Aristotle's definition of universal justice is by far the most important. Aristotle looks at the definition of its opposite, or what it means to be unjust. His discussion begins with the exam.. 1980.