Socrates' argument that virtue cannot be taught In the second half of Plato's Meno, Socrates doubts whether virtue is a kind of knowledge teachable and instead claims that it is a result of “true opinion” (97b). Reading Socrates' argument, I find that while his doubt that virtue is teachable knowledge is justified, the evidence he uses is flawed. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay After Meno insists that Socrates approach the original question Meno asked him, namely: “whether…virtue is something teachable, or is a natural gift, or in any way it comes to men ” (86d). Socrates begins by posing the first assumption: “if virtue is a form of knowledge, it is clear that it could be taught” (87c). This leads to a new question: “knowledge of virtue or something else” (87c)? Meno and Socrates therefore agree that “virtue itself is something good” (87d). Therefore, if “there is something else good that is different and separate from knowledge, virtue may not be a kind of knowledge; if there is nothing good that knowledge does not include, we would be right to suspect that it is a kind of knowledge” (87d). they are good they are beneficial “for everything that is good is beneficial” (87e). Socrates then looks at other things that are beneficial to people such as health, strength, and beauty. (87e). He emphasizes “that even these same things sometimes harm” (88a). Whether or not a good or soul quality is used correctly determines whether or not it harms or benefits a person (88a). For example, if someone is courageous without wisdom, his recklessness will harm him. If they are courageous and wise, then they benefit. The same dynamic, of the benefit that comes when a good is used wisely and the harm that comes when a good is used ignorantly, applies to other things such as moderation and mental quickness (88b). Therefore, "everything that the soul undertakes and endures, if directed by wisdom, ends in happiness, but if directed by ignorance, ends in the opposite" (88c). Therefore, it would seem that since qualities of the soul, such as courage and moderation, "in themselves are neither beneficial nor harmful" while virtue is beneficial, it follows that virtue "must be a kind of wisdom" since wisdom helps direct the qualities of the soul to be beneficial (88d). It would seem then that if virtue is a type of wisdom, then virtue must be a type of knowledge (88c). Furthermore, good people are not good by nature but rather by learning, since virtue seems to be a type of knowledge and if it is knowledge it is teachable. (89c) Socrates challenges the conclusion he draws that virtue is teachable knowledge by saying, "I am not saying that it is wrong to say that virtue is teachable if it is knowledge, but see whether it is reasonable for me to doubt that it is knowledge" (89d) He maintains the original assumption that knowledge is teachable and instead disputes that virtue is a type of knowledge. but despite all [his] efforts [he could] find none” (89e ). Socrates points out that if someone wanted to learn a trade such as shoemaker [90c], be a doctor, play the flute or any other trade [90d], would turn to someone who is expert in those respective professions. There are merchants of virtue.