IndexIntroductionMorality and judgmentInternal morality of lawConclusionIntroductionThe separability thesis is a fragment of a legal positivist normative concept, in which it emphasizes that laws and morality are separate from each other. John Austin indicated that "the continuity of law is one thing, its advantages or disadvantages another." For example, law does not need moral authority to be law, and whether or not there is a “law” is the answer based solely on empirical verification. An interpretation that laws are established on social proof. Legal philosophers have focused primarily on the question of whether morality and law are necessarily associated; the logical question is, “how are law and morality related?” Only some of the ways in which law and morality are linked are of possible philosophical importance. There are at least two objections to this separability thesis. Hart states that there is no essential certainty that law imitates or satisfies clear demands of morality. Hart is known for his disapproval of his positivist precursor, in which he discards "command theory" and emphasizes that law has numerous other foundations that constitute its characteristics. Similar to Hart, not all positivists precisely emphasize the separation thesis. Inclusive positivists argue that law has no morality, although, in obvious situations, this may be the case. On the other hand, exclusivist positivists encourage the firm principle that laws and morality are different, rather than that answers must originate from the foundations of laws. Joseph Raz states that there are no moral disagreements to be raised by law, legal authority simply rests on the foundations of laws. However, in this article, I will refute the claim that laws have morality that can be discovered within them. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay Morality and JudgmentJudges faced with difficult cases alternate with moral philosophies. Dworkin argues that judges appeal to moral values ​​when faced with difficult cases. He does not agree that the positivist claim about laws simply contains rules. Two well-known qualities of Ronald Dworkin's decision-making philosophy create a strange difficulty. Dworkin argues that many events, which contain most of the "hard" cases, have "correct answers". In contradiction, Dworkin argues that to find that correct answer, judges should take advantage of moral concerns and moral disagreement: a group's privileges arise from the principle that it clarifies some important part of the previously established story and provides the best defense for that story institutional as a matter of political morality. As far as Dworkin is concerned, there are three stages of judgment. The first phase involves researching applicable philosophies. The next phase involves a procedure of logical representation of the situated principles of law. The last stage involves applying the law to the most appropriate case. In difficult cases, the interpretation process would not apply at all, or if it did, it would cease in the second stage because there will be no situation-relevant principle that best suits the circumstances. For example, in the case of Riggs v Palmer, the offender tried to rely on the law to derive the land, the judge went through all the information steps to find out the applicable law and whether the judge should have applied the law the The outcome would have been ridiculous. Therefore, in the final information phase, the judge resorts to determinationof moral values. All these cases exemplify that morality must be found in the law, henceforth the separability thesis is uncertain. However, there is an apparent objection in the above controversies. The theory fails to address the general morality of the law. Dworkin's proposal includes only the use of moral principles while judging difficult cases. As a result, numerous legal events are interpreted according to legal cases, and most judges do not rely on moral principles to resolve issues, but obey the law exactly. For example, traffic courts respect legal bases rather than moral values. Likewise, there is no option for moral values ​​when settlements are based in most lower courts. The objection could clarify the view that the implementation of moral values ​​is based only on the findings of the High Court. Consequently, the concept is based on a small measure of the cases of the law, it does not provide a complete opinion on whether the law has moral scopes or not. Internal Morality of the Law Many understand Lon Fuller's view on the internal morality of the law as meant to encompass a way in which the law has the control to change the kinds of purposes we have to perform: to enable us to redescribe an average directive as a moral condition. The fundamental assumption remains that the control of imitating the normative character of what should be completed of the law is a purpose of the rules that guide the legislature. In the model, case law is created simply if it is constructed having fully satisfied the eight standards. He regards them as moral necessities in the legislative process, although this is indeed a controversial statement. Instead, some discuss them as essential moral restrictions on legislative procedure or as theoretical restrictions on the law. It might help us think about what Fuller intended to address if we consider the eight standards of the law's internal morality. Fuller argues that the fundamental internal morality arises from the encounter with the norm of the principles of legality. Therefore, that rules must be universal, must be widespread, rules must work, laws must be transparent and reliable, refrain from enacting laws where agreement would be irrational, the permanence of laws excluding common modifications, and the question of law and applicability should be consistent. Therefore, if these values ​​must be functional to the laws, in the current legal method, the regulations meet the standards. For example, the regulation of not killing individuals. One can argue convincingly that not killing individuals is a usually appropriate rule. It is evident and reliable with social standards, likewise, such right is very potential, so it meets the essential type of public prosperity and defends them from dangers. Fuller could have established that Nazi laws were not regulations at all as they had no internal morality, in the example of Nazi Germany's grievance cases. If the separability thesis were real, one could argue that the Nazi laws were certainly laws and it would be difficult to condemn these laws to the exclusion of morality. Furthermore, legislators are expected to present a reconsideration of the rules for broadcasting offensive newspaper articles against the government. If the standard were to be adapted to this type of law, it would surely collapse in the face of the potential purpose of the legal standard. Disappointment in consulting the rules would undermine a rule that is contrary to public prosperity and not moral. However, if this is not the case, the regulations balance the need to make the thesis of inapplicable.