For Aristotle, the doctrine of the mean is a moral framework of reference through which the character of every man can be better understood. When applied to specific virtues such as courage, it illuminates what Aristotle believes to be the complex relationship between the agent of virtue, his judgment, and his character. However, the value of the theory of the mean lies in the recognition of man's moral autonomy, an independence made necessary by the incomplete and inconclusive nature of Aristotle's doctrine. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay Aristotle's account of virtue in the Ethics is structured through his organizing principle, the doctrine of the mean. First, he develops virtue as a means through the analogy of art. He writes: "A master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this "intermediate not in the object but in relation to us" (1106b5). Therefore, the standard by which every art does his work well and by which the good artist is judged is by looking towards the intermediate. For Aristotle, virtue is "more exact and better than any art". 'intermediate (1106b10). He claims to be interested here in moral virtue, the body of virtue that includes passions and actions and their inherent excesses, deficiencies and intermediaries. What is this intermediation that the master artist of the good life is aiming at? what is intermediate is experiencing the right pleasures and pains at the right time, with the right motive and in the right way; as regards actions (1106b20). Therefore, we find that there are four components of the mean within each mean of the virtue itself: the mean with respect to emotions, pleasures and pains, attitude and intention, and action both in excess and in lack of these components of the mean are forms of failure, but the middle is a form of success at which virtue aims. Finally, from this Aristotle concludes that it is possible to fail in many ways, but to succeed is possible in only one way. Aristotle. summarizes this explanation of virtue as a mean and introduces the secondary element of choice in 1107a: Virtue, then, is a state of character which concerns choice, lying in a mean. . . with respect to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Furthermore, virtue is a mean between two vices, one which is below and the other which exceeds what is right in passions and actions. How does the doctrine of the mean develop for the specific virtue of courage? Aristotle begins by characterizing courage as an average through a rating starting from 3.6, using the elements of fear and trust as measurement parameters. First of all, we ask ourselves: what do men fear? Because he defines fear as the expectation of evil, he concludes that the things one fears are terrible things, evils such as misfortune, poverty, and disease (1115a10). Yet there is a distinction among men regarding fear. The courageous man fears only what is right and noble to fear, and it would be cowardly if he did not fear them. The courageous man fears the greatest thing, death, in the noblest circumstances of danger: he is courageous who is not afraid in the face of a noble death (1115a30). All terrible things are not terrible in the same magnitude and degree; some are terrible beyond human strength. Even if the brave man fears even the things within human strength, he will face them as he should and as the rule prescribes, for the sake of honor; for this is the end of virtue (1115a30). Not just the objects of fearthey are characterized by variation, but fear, as an emotion, is also subject to degrees and variations: one can fear more or less. The courageous man faces and fears the right things and with the right reason, in the right way and at the right time. He feels and acts according to the merits of each case as the rule directs "thereby attaining the mean in action, emotion and intention" with the aim or objective of conforming to the state of courageous character. Since courage is noble and everything is defined by its purpose, the purpose of courage is noble. Therefore, the courageous man resists and acts as courage directs for a noble end (1115b20). Aristotle analyzes the state of courage and its opposite states through an analysis of the magnitudes of fear and confidence. Aristotle calls those who exceed in courage insensitive, and those who exceed in confidence reckless (1115b25). The reckless man demands and imitates courage: as the courageous man is towards what is terrible, so the reckless man desires to appear (1115b30). In his analysis, Aristotle overlaps the genres of recklessness and cowardice, arguing that the reckless man acts in both ways: by nature reckless, the reckless man does not persevere against what is truly terrible, showing himself to be cowardly as well. It seems, therefore, that the reckless man deviates from the average of courage in both directions, although characterized above all by his overconfidence. In contrast, the coward is excessive in fear, fearing both what he should and what he should not, and lacks confidence. In summary: the cowardly, the imprudent and the courageous man therefore deal with the same objects, but oppose them in different ways; because the first two pass and miss, while the third holds the middle, which is the right position. (1116a5)For Aristotle, courage is the means with respect to objects that inspire emotions of trust or fear, choosing and enduring these objects for the nobility or baseness of doing so. Fear and trust play the defining roles around which the story of courage is structured. They combine the four components of meaning (emotion, pleasure/pain, intention and action). Fear and trust are the emotions that push us to act and give the action the intention or attitude that accompanies it, and arise through man's sensitivity to pleasure and pain "the pleasure of carrying out ignoble and the pain implicit in performing noble actions". Aristotle writes, if virtues concern actions and passions, and every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain, for this reason virtue will also concern pleasures and pains (1104b15 Yet, paradoxically, although courage comes by facing what is). painful, has a pleasant and noble end that is hidden by present circumstances. This is central to the internal conflict of the courageous man: he must reconcile his feeling of fear (aversion to pain and desire for security) and the uncertainty that resides in it. his feeling of trust with the desire for good which is the goal. Here there is a conflict between the external purpose and the connected internal feelings. The courageous man places due value on these dangers, goods and objectives and controls himself accordingly. Aristotle's theory of the mean makes two models possible for identifying the mean. The first consists in fixing the two extremes (state of excess and deficiency) in relation to each other, and consequently fixing the optimal average with respect to these two points. The second model involves starting from an independent optimum and identifying the two end directions. With respect to courage, Aristotle proposes and adopts the second approach, identifying the means based on man's feelings of fear and trust. His methodology is centered on fear. Aristotle first takes the things that are feared by men and identifies what they should berightly feared and which are not to be feared. The courageous man achieves the path of courage by fearing what is to be feared, facing it if necessary, and, furthermore, facing what is not to be feared. Having identified this meaning, Aristotle characterizes the callous, reckless, and cowardly man by the extent and correctness of his fears and actions.in enduring or abstaining from the objects of his fear. The doctrine of the mean, with its structural analysis of virtue and its opposition, raises the question of who will be able to identify the mean. Is proper judgment about right and wrong a necessary precursor to identifying the mean? Aristotle implies that it is. In 1143a20 he defines judgment as the just discrimination of the just. Being a man of good and correct judgment consists in knowing how to judge about the things with which practical wisdom deals (1143a30). Therefore, right judgment reconciles the understanding and discrimination of equity with practical wisdom. The identification of a virtue, already defined as the means determined by the rational principle according to which a man of practical wisdom follows, requires a right judgment on the part of the agent regarding what is right and wrong (1107a). In support of this position, Aristotle distinguishes states of character that he considers false types of courage. Among these is the courage of the citizen-soldier: because he is forced to act as he does, he does not have his own correct judgment about what is noble. Even the passionate person is not truly courageous because he lacks the choice and motivation that follow from correct judgment: he is like a wild beast, who acts not out of love but out of the strength of his passions. Finally, the ignorant person who acts courageously is excluded from having true courage: he or she lacks self-awareness and self-confidence, and therefore lacks good judgment. For Aristotle, judgment can be wrong, but right judgment implies that one has judged correctly about right and wrong, and to the extent that the virtue of courage has as its goal what is noble and right, right judgment precedes identification of the vehicle. The point to consider in conclusion is whether or not the identification of the average is necessarily followed by a virtuous action. Do humans sometimes err in acting virtuously even when they have knowledge of the average virtuous state? Plato states that if good is known, men will choose this good, because no one voluntarily chooses what is harmful. Aristotle echoes this position by arguing that every action. . . aim at something good (1094a). Although action is linked to intention and emotion, each is given a separate and independent existence. By extension, is right judgment separate from choice? For Aristotle, virtue is a state of character that concerns choice, lying in a mean (1107a). He states that right judgment cannot be separated from the choice that manifests itself in the correct and virtuous character, the one that is chosen for its intermediation. Therefore, right judgment is a necessary condition for the agent's identification of the mean. Please note: this is just an example. Get a custom article from our expert writers now. Get a Custom Essay Aristotle's doctrine of the mean provides a moral framework that is not based morally but rather on the elements of our functioning as human beings: emotion, action, intention, pleasure, and pain. However, this moral framework is primarily a technical description of the range of possibilities within man's moral autonomy rather than a guide. it simply seems to make clearer what we should already know: in Aristotle's understanding of the variable, he seems to have mastered the30).